




















Defending the Pondicherry interpretation: A response
to Shafiee, Jafar-Aghdami, and Golshani
U. Mohrhoff




Recently Shafiee, Jafar-Aghdami, and Golshani (Studies in History and Philosophy
of Modern Physics, 37, 316–329) took issue with certain aspects of the Pondicherry
interpretation of quantum mechanics, especially its definition(s) and use(s) of “ob-
jective probability”, its conception of space, the role it assigns to the macroworld
in a universe governed by quantum laws, and its claim for the completeness of
quantum mechanics. Here these issues are addressed and resolved.




A decade ago it was pointed out by Dieks (1996) that
the outcome of foundational work in the last couple of decades has been that
interpretations [of quantum mechanics] which try to accommodate classical
intuitions are impossible, on the grounds that theories that incorporate such
intuitions necessarily lead to empirical predictions which are at variance with
the quantum mechanical predictions. However, this is a negative result that
only provides us with a starting-point for what really has to be done: some-
thing conceptually new has to be found, different from what we are familiar
with. It is clear that this constructive task is a particularly difficult one, in
which huge barriers (partly of a psychological nature) have to be overcome.
Apart from finding a general and consistent interpretational scheme, there is
the difficulty of “getting a feeling” for it; to attain a position in which one un-
derstands the interpretation. . . The sheer difficulty of the situation, in which
the only thing that is certain is that familiar concepts do not work, surely is
one central element of the particular situation in quantum mechanics.
Dieks further remarked that
all these discussions [about the physical meaning of the mathematical for-
malism of quantum mechanics], both the original ones between the founding
fathers of quantum mechanics and the more recent ones, were and are carried
on in very small circles. . . Inside the small group of cognoscenti one faces the
tremendous task of framing a new conceptual scheme that should replace the
familiar ideas that are impressed upon us by everyday experience.
These observations are as true today as they were at the time they were written. The
“Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics” (PIQM) (Mohrhoff, 2000, 2001,
2002abcd, 2004ab, 2005b, 2006a) is a more recent attempt at this particularly difficult
constructive task, in which huge barriers (arguably largely of a psychological nature,
Mohrhoff, 2005a, 2006a) have to be overcome. As the architect of this interpretation, I
can vouch for the difficulty (and importance) of “getting a feeling” for it. In my case—but
this is probably true for most explorers of uncharted intellectual terrain—the “feeling”
comes first. As Plato pointed out in the Meno, if discovery does generate novelties, it
cannot arrive at its results through a reasoned procedure (Hamilton and Cairns, 1961).
Campbell (1974) has put it this way: “When we venture beyond that which we already
know, we have no choice but to explore without benefit of wisdom: blindly, stupidly,
haphazardly” (p. 142).
The process of discovery can be described as an exchange between internal agents
representing complementary interests—faithfulness of the articulation to what feels right
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on the one hand, and the demands of consistency and communicability (clearness, ex-
plicitness, etc.) on the other. In an apt simile, Blachowicz (1997) has compared the
rhythm of proposal and disposal in scientific discovery to the exchange between a police
artist and a witness. My published expositions of the PIQM from 2000 to the present
mark different stages of this exchange, which continues. A critic of this interpretation
is therefore presented with a potentially confusing variety of articulations of the same
underlying “feeling”.1
A critique of the PIQM was published in a recent issue of this Journal (Shafiee, et al.,
2006). The authors remark that “Mohrhoff’s interpretation challenges one’s intuition.” I
heartily concur. On the positive side, Shafiee, Jafar-Aghdami, & Golshani (SJG) maintain
that I introduce “a new understanding of spatiotemporal events, the character of physical
reality and the meaning of objective probability”, and that
this interpretation has some attractions. At least, some parts of the ontologi-
cal attitude of Mohrhoff about the quantum world is fascinating. For example,
his view about the supervenience of the reality of phenomena in micro-world
on the events of macro-world or his metaphysical view about the ‘space as the
totality of existing spatial relations’ deserves attention. Mohrhoff’s interpre-
tation decisively affects the way one observes the quantum world.
But whereas SJG rightly believe “that our understanding of the quantum phenomena
should be compatible with all levels of physical description,” they doubt that the PIQM
“can satisfactorily supply such compatibility” and perceive “imperfections and incoheren-
cies involved in Mohrhoff’s conceptualization of space and time.” The purpose of this
article is to dispel these doubts and to explain why the perceived imperfections and
incoherences only exist “in the eye of the beholder.”
The four main concerns of SJG are my views on quantum-mechanical probabilities,
space, the macroworld, and the completeness of quantum mechanics. These concerns are
addressed in Secs. 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. The final section aims to take the mystery
out of what is probably the most challenging feature of the PIQM—the supervenience of
the microscopic on the macroscopic.
2 Probability
The PIQM is an interpretation of unadulterated, standard quantum mechanics. It is
offered as an attempt to make sense of a hypothetical world in which the quantum-
mechanical probability assignments are always exactly right, without nonlinear or stochas-
tic modifications to Schro¨dinger’s equation. It interprets a hypothetical world in which
1Blachowicz uses the word “meaning,” as in “intended meaning” or “unarticulated meaning” (Bla-
chowicz, 1994).
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the reason why hidden variables are hidden is that hidden variables—be they local or
nonlocal, contextual or noncontextual—do not exist. By the same token, it does not
countenance absolute probabilities.2 In addition it assumes that an arbitrarily small
quantitative difference—for instance, the difference between probability 1 and a proba-
bility arbitrarily close to but less than 1, or the difference between off-diagonal matrix
elements equal to 0 and off-diagonal matrix elements arbitrarily close to but unequal to 0,
or the difference between exact bi-orthogonality and however-near bi-orthogonality—does
not account for the significant difference between the possession of a property (by a physi-
cal system) or a value (by an observable) and the lack thereof. In other words, it interprets
a hypothetical world without “elements of reality,” in which neither probability 1, nor
the diagonality of a reduced density-matrix, nor exact bi-orthogonality is sufficient for is
or has.3
Then what is? According to the PIQM, to be is to be measured, and any event or
state of affairs from which the truth or falsity of a proposition of the form “system S
has the property P” (or “observable O has the value V ”) can be inferred, qualifies as a
measurement. No property or value is possessed unless its possession is indicated by, or
inferable from, an actual event or state of affairs. (There is no need for anyone to actually
make the inference.) The properties of quantum systems are extrinsic in this particular
sense. They supervene on property-indicating events (in this particular sense).
The quantum laws, accordingly, are correlation laws: they quantify correlations be-
tween (primarily) property-indicating events and (secondarily) properties indicated by
events. Since the PIQM does not countenance absolute probabilities (cf. Footnote 2), the
existence of correlations is tantamount to the dependence of the probabilities of possible
outcomes on actual or assumed outcomes, rather than to the existence of absolute joint
probability distributions that are non-factorizable. If we use the quantum-mechanical
correlation laws to assign probabilities, we are free to choose (i) the actual or assumed
outcome (or outcomes) on the basis of which we assign probabilities, and (ii) the mea-
surement (or measurements) to the possible outcomes of which we assign probabilities.
SJG are therefore right in saying that I differentiate between the laws of physics (qua
2The conditionality of quantum-mechanical probabilities was also stressed by Primas (2003), who
draws attention to an axiomatic alternative to Kolmogorov’s (1950) formulation of probability theory,
due to Re´nyi (1955, 1970), pointing out that every result of Kolmogorov’s theory, in which absolute
probabilities have primacy over conditional ones, has a translation into Re´nyi’s theory, which is based
entirely on conditional probabilities.
3There is another reason why probability 1 is not sufficient for is or has. Implicit in every quantum-
mechanical probability assignment is the assumption that a measurement is successfully made: there is an
outcome. (After all, this is the reason why the probabilities of the possible outcomes of a measurement
add up to 1.) This also holds in the special case in which the quantum-mechanical probability of a
particular outcome equals 1. Quantum mechanics therefore yields probabilities with which this or that
outcome is obtained in a successful measurement, not probabilities with which this or that property or
value is possessed, regardless of measurements.
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correlation laws) and the way we make use of them, but contrary to their assertion that,
according to me, “probability assignments have to be considered as fundamental as the
quantum laws themselves”, I consider the correlation laws “more fundamental” than the
probabilities we assign with their help (for once allowing “fundamental” to have a com-
parative).
The first exposition of the PIQM (Mohrhoff, 2000) was, as the title “What quantum
mechanics is trying to tell us” suggests, a response to Mermin’s (1998) exposition of
the “Ithaca interpretation,” which bore the title “What is quantum mechanics trying to
tell us?”. While it did not accept Mermin’s division of reality into a physical and a non-
physical part—at any rate, not for the purpose of making sense of quantum mechanics—it
was nevertheless strongly influenced by his thinking at that time4. Mermin decided not
to
explore further the notion of probability and correlation as objective properties
of individual physical systems, though the validity of much of what I say
depends on subsequent efforts to make this less problematic. My instincts are
that this is the right order to proceed in: objective probability arises only in
quantum mechanics. We will understand it better only when we understand
quantum mechanics better. My strategy is to try to understand quantum
mechanics contingent on an understanding of objective probability, and only
then to see what that understanding teaches us about objective probability. . .
The aim is to see whether all the mysteries of quantum mechanics can be
reduced to this single puzzle. I believe that they can[.]
Propelled by his belief that all the mysteries of quantum mechanics can be reduced to the
single puzzle posed by the existence of objective probabilities, I decided, on the contrary,
to explore that notion. My instincts were (and still are) that we will understand quantum
mechanics better only when we have a better understanding of objective probability.
There are several reasons to consider quantum-mechanical probability assignments
objective (in several respective senses):
1. They are based on objective, value-indicating events and objective physical laws.
2. They play an essential role even when there is nothing to be ignorant about.
3. They are needed to define and quantify an objective indeterminacy or “fuzziness.”
(According to the PIQM, the proper way to define and quantify a fuzzy state of
affairs is to assign probabilities counterfactually, to the possible outcomes of unper-
formed measurements.)
4“Chris Fuchs has taught me to beware of conjoining ‘objective’ to ‘probability’.” (Mermin in Arndt,
et al., 2005).
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4. They are not based on degrees of belief. (The stability of the hydrogen atom
rests on the objective indeterminacies of its internal relative position and relative
momentum, rather than on anyone’s degree of belief or uncertainty about the values
of these observables.)
How should one describe a quantum system between measurements short of transmo-
grifying a probability algorithm like the wave function into an evolving state of affairs?
The PIQM stipulates that even the description of a quantum system between property-
indicating events be based on property-indicating events. Suppose, for instance, that
measurements have been made at t1 and t2, respectively, and that no measurements have
been made in the meantime. The facts relevant to the description of the system between
t1 and t2 are then all of the property-indicating events—in particular, the measurements
made at t1 and t2—that bear upon the probabilities of the possible outcomes of measure-
ments that could have been made (but were not) between t1 and t2 (Mohrhoff, 2000, 2001,
2004a). If assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of unperformed measurements
is the proper way to define and quantify an indeterminate or fuzzy state of affairs, this
yields a description of a fuzzy state of affairs. Since this counterfactually described state
of affairs, like every possessed property of the system, supervenes on property-indicating
events, it would not be appropriate to conceive of it as a repository of propensities, inas-
much as propensities tend to be viewed as intrinsic.
Here, then, are two senses of “objective” in which (according to the PIQM) quantum
probabilities do not qualify as objective:
1. Being single-case probabilities, they are not objective in the sense of being relative
frequencies.
2. In spite of being single-case probabilities, they are not objective in the sense of
being propensities.
In addition to giving reasons why (and why not) quantum probabilities are objective, I
have argued that there are objective as well as subjective ways of using them (Mohrhoff,
2001). One arrives at an objective description of the indeterminate state of affairs that
obtains between measurements if and only if, in assigning probabilities to the possible
outcomes of unperformed measurements, all relevant facts are taken into account. In gen-
eral this includes past as well as future events, for quantum mechanics allows us to assign
probabilities on the basis of not only earlier or later measurement outcomes using Born’s
rule but also earlier and later measurement outcomes using the ABL rule5 (Aharonov, et
al., 1964). If one assigns probabilities to the possible outcomes of unperformed measure-
ments, with a view to describing a fuzzy state of affairs obtaining between measurements,
5The statement of the ABL rule in (Shafiee, et al., 2006) is incorrect. In place of the absolute values
in equation (1) there should be absolute squares.
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without taking all relevant facts into account, one arrives at a description that is marred
by a subjective element of ignorance. This subjective contamination is what makes some
probability assignments subjective (in this particular sense).
The following statements by SJG are thus either liable to be misunderstood or incor-
rect, and if incorrect then due to either a misunderstanding on the part of SJG or an
incorrect statement in one of my earlier paper. (My purpose here is to clarify rather than
to sort this out.)
[According to Mohrhoff] objective probability should not merely be attributed
to actually observed measurement results.
Assignments of probabilities to the possible outcomes of actually performed measurements
are, in fact, subjective in the last mentioned sense, inasmuch as they do not take into
account the actual outcomes of such measurements. In this particular sense, only proba-
bilities assigned to the possible outcomes of unperformed measurements can be objective.
According to Mohrhoff, what the ABL rule basically shows is that for calcu-
lating quantum probabilities both the initial and the final states of the system
are to be known.
This is an odd way of saying that if one wants to assign probabilities on the basis of
earlier and later outcomes, then one has to use the ABL rule.
One of the consequences of introducing objective probability in quantum the-
ory is objective indefiniteness, in Mohrhoff’s view.
This rather puts the cart before the horse. According to the PIQM, objective indeter-
minacy is a salient feature of the physical world. Assigning probabilities to the possible
outcomes of unperformed measurements is merely a way—albeit the only one I know—of
describing a fuzzy state of affairs.
He considers probabilistic propositions in quantum mechanics to be counter-
factual. . . in his view. . . the attribution of probability to the results of actually
performed experiments is not appropriate[.]
As a matter of fact, probabilities can be assigned to the possible outcomes of both per-
formed and unperformed measurements. (If probabilistic propositions were merely coun-
terfactual, quantum mechanics would not be a testable theory.)
[N]either correlations nor correlata have physical reality in Mohrhoff’s view.
In truth, I consider the quantum-mechanical correlation laws as real as any fundamen-
tal physical law. The correlata are (primarily) value-indicating events and (secondarily)
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indicated values. They too form part of reality. It was Mermin (1998) who denied (phys-
ical) reality to the correlata. For him, their unreality was “an inescapable consequence
of many different ‘no-hidden-variables’ theorems” which “require that if all correlations
have simultaneous physical reality, then all the correlated quantities themselves cannot.”
(This corresponds to my denying reality to unmeasured values.) I know of no one who
denies the reality of both the correlations and the correlata.
Marchildon (2004) challenges Mohrhoff’s speculation, since for him the non-
valuedness of [an unmeasured observable] does not logically follow from a
counterfactual construction of the ABL rule.
Although the non-valuedness of unmeasured observables is strongly suggested by the ‘no-
hidden-variables’ theorems mentioned by Mermin, I never claimed that there is anything
from which the non-valuedness of unmeasured observables follows logically. Marchildon
concluded his (2004) with the words: “In the interpretation he has put forth, Mohrhoff has
shown us a thought-provoking and original view of the way that, according to quantum
mechanics, the world can be.” His concerns are addressed in my (2004a).
Kastner (2001) has. . . argued that Mohrhoff’s application of the ABL rule. . .
fail[s] to escape the conclusion of the proofs which state that the counterfactual
usage of the ABL rule yields consequences that are inconsistent with quantum
theory.
For refutations of these alleged “proofs” (Sharp & Shanks, 1993; Cohen, 1995; Miller,
1996; Kastner, 1999ab) see my (2001) as well as (Vaidman, 1999).
[I]f we accept [Mohrhoff’s] attitude, we must necessarily be committed to the
irreducibility of the concept of probability. . . If the concept of probability
is taken to be a non-reducible one, the realization of some counterfactual
statements in the measurement process has no justification, save mere chance.
But, to avoid a notion of objective chance, Mohrhoff introduces the concept
of objective indefiniteness[.]
Neither do I wish to avoid the notion of objective chance, nor do I introduce the concept
of objective indeterminacy for the purpose of avoiding this notion. The remainder of the
passage is correct. To my way of thinking, possibility and its quantifiable cousin probabil-
ity are irreducible concepts, and value-indicating events lack causally sufficient conditions
(Ulfbeck & Bohr, 2001; Mohrhoff, 2002b, 2004a). The reason for the latter is that the
probability of an event indicating a particular value V of a given observable O is the
product of two probabilities: (i) the probability of the occurrence of an event indicating
a possible value of O and (ii) the probability that the indicated value is V (given that
a value is indicated). Quantum theory is exclusively concerned with probabilities of the
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latter kind. In assigning probabilities, it implicitly assumes the (actual or counterfactual)
occurrence of a value-indicating event, and therefore it cannot account for it. And if
it is fundamental, nothing can account for it, just as nothing can explain why there is
anything, rather than nothing at all.
[O]nce one considers objective probabilities to be statistical distributions over
counterfactual statements, there appears a possibility of defining joint prob-
abilities for incompatible quantities. One can take into account a complete
set of eigenvalues of two incompatible observables, and if the statistical dis-
tributions do not refer to real events, one can define joint probabilities for the
results of those two quantities[.]
Quantum mechanics is concerned with distributions over possible measurement outcomes.
Even the possible outcomes of unperformed measurements are possible outcomes of mea-
surements, and if measurements are incompatible in the actual world, they are also in-
compatible in all (nomologically) possible worlds. If, for instance, the x and y components
of a spin-1/2 system are measured at the times t1 and t2, respectively, if both outcomes
are “up”, and if the system is not subjected to any measurement in the meantime, then
the following counterfactuals are true:
• If the x component had been measured in the meantime (other things being equal),
then the outcome “up” would have been obtained with probability 1.
• If the y component had been measured in the meantime (other things being equal),
then the outcome “up” would have been obtained with probability 1.
• If first the x component and then the y component had been measured in the
meantime (other things being equal), then the outcome “up” would have been
obtained with probability 1 in both measurements.
• If first the y component and then the x component had been measured in the
meantime (other things being equal), then the outcome “up” would have been
obtained with probability 1/2 in both measurements.
All of these counterfactuals (and infinitely many others) contribute to describe the fuzzy
state of affairs that obtains between t1 and t2. The same does not hold for counterfactuals
whose antecedents are nomologically impossible (e.g., “if both the x and y components
had been measured simultaneously in the meantime”).
3 Space
The PIQM arrives at its ontological affirmations by analyzing quantum-mechanical prob-
ability assignments in different measurement contexts, rather than via an ontologization
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of mathematical algorithms or symbols. This is most straightforwardly done by adopt-
ing the approach popularized by Feynman (Feynman, et al., 1965), according to which
probabilities are added if alternatives are experimentally distinguishable, whereas am-
plitudes are added if alternatives are experimentally indistinguishable. In other words,
if one wants to calculate the probability of a particular outcome of a measurement M2,
given the actual outcome of an earlier measurement M1, one must choose a sequence of
measurements that may be made in the meantime, and apply the appropriate rule:
• If the intermediate measurements are made (or if it is possible to infer from other
measurements what their outcomes would have been if they had been made), one
first squares the absolute values of the amplitudes associated with the alternatives
and then adds the results.
• If the intermediate measurements are not made (and if it is not possible to infer
from other measurements what their outcomes would have been), one first adds the
amplitudes associated with the alternatives and then squares the absolute value of
the result.
The principal interpretational strategy of the PIQM is now readily stated:
• Whenever quantum mechanics requires that amplitudes be added, the distinctions
we make between the possible sequences of intermediate outcomes (“alternatives”)
are distinctions that “Nature does not make”: they correspond to nothing in the
real world; they exists solely in our minds.
The paradigm example is the two-slit experiment with electrons (Feynman, et al., 1965,
Secs. 1.1–6). It has been said that an electron—or a fullerene, for that matter (Arndt,
et al., 1999)—can go simultaneously through more than one slit.6 How can it do this
without getting divided into parts that go through different slits? It can do this because
space is neither a self-existent (substantial) expanse nor does it have parts. If the setup
demands that amplitudes be added, the distinction we make between the alternatives “the
electron went through the left slit” and “the electron went through the right slit” has no
counterpart in the real world. The reason this is possible is that the difference between the
two alternatives rests on spatial distinctions that are not real per se. There is no intrinsic
partition of space that forces the electron to choose which “region of space” to be in.
Instead, the unity of the electron (or the logical unity of the fullerene’s center-of-mass)
militates against the conception of space as an intrinsically partitioned expanse.
6“Since both slits are needed for the interference pattern to appear and since it is impossible to know
which slit the electron passed through without destroying that pattern, one is forced to the conclusion
that the electron goes through both slits at the same time” (Encyclopædia Brittanica, 2006).
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According to the PIQM, physical space is a set of relations; it contains—in the proper,
set-theoretic sense of “containment”—the spatial relations that hold among material ob-
jects. The form of a composite object is the totality of its internal spatial relations. A
particle lacking internal relations is therefore a formless rather than a literally pointlike
object.7 Space thus contains the forms of all things that have forms, but it does not
contain the formless so-called “ultimate constituents of matter” (quarks and leptons, ac-
cording to the Standard Model of particle physics). It is the web spun by their (more
or less fuzzy) relations. Nor is there such a thing as empty space, not because space is
teeming with virtual particles or vacuum fluctuations, but because unpossessed positions
do not exist; where “there” is nothing, there is no there.
As said, fuzzy spatial relations (relative positions as well as relative orientations) are
quantitatively described by assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of measure-
ments. What are the possible outcomes of a measurement of a continuous observable?
Just as classical mechanics idealizes by assuming exact positions, so standard quantum
mechanics idealizes by assuming that the possible outcomes of a position measurement
correspond to a partition “of space.” Because space is not an intrinsically partitioned
expanse, spatial distinctions are relative and contingent: relative because the distinction
between (what we conceive of as) two disjoint regions (e.g., inside R and outside R) may
be real for one object and nonexistent for another (or for the same object at a different
time); and contingent because the reality of that distinction for a given object O (at a
given time t) depends on whether the corresponding proposition (“O is in R at t”) has
a definite truth value (either “true” or “false”), and this in turn depends on whether a
definite truth value is indicated.
A particle detector is therefore needed not only to indicate the presence of a particle
in the detector’s sensitive region but also to realize (make real) the distinction between
inside and outside that region, thereby making it possible to attribute to a particle the
property of being inside or outside that region. Generally speaking, the measurement
apparatus, presupposed by every quantum-mechanical probability assignment, is needed
not only for the purpose of indicating the possession a particular property or value but
also for the purpose of realizing a set of properties or values, which thereby become
available for attribution.
SJG’s presentation of these ideas is, to say the least, awkward. Particularly disturbing
is their frequent use of the word “space” in place of “position,” for example when they
write that “space could exist for an object in a definite instant, but not existing [sic]
for another object at the same instant and not existing for the same object at another
instant” or that in the context of a two-slit experiment (for which it is appropriate to add
amplitudes) one “can only talk about both the L and R slits as the space possessed by
7A pointlike form would be another hidden “variable.”
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the object.”
SJG correctly point out that the detection of a single electron at the backdrop “does
not say anything about the position of the electron in the whole L and R region” but
then conclude erroneously that
the statement ‘The electron’s position is in the entire region L&R’ is not true,
because this statement cannot be justified by the indication of an individual
particle.
In view of the relative and contingent reality of spatial distinctions, it is precisely because
there is nothing8 that indicates where exactly the electron passed the slit plate that the
distinction we make between “through L” and “through R” has no reality as far as the
electron is concerned.
Nor is it correct to assert, as SJG do, that said statement is “not consistent with the
description given by quantum mechanics.” All that SJG can justifiably assert is that
the PIQM, which denies the existence of hidden variables, is inconsistent with whatever
interpretational scheme SJG have at the back of their minds. If I guess correctly at their
meaning of “probability space” and “real space,” the same applies to their claim that
the identification of the two spaces is “not compatible with what quantum mechanics
describes.”
Turning to the Gedanken experiment introduced by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen
(1935) to argue that quantum mechanics is not a complete theory, SJG state, correctly,
that “indication of position or momentum of particle 1 does not necessarily lead to [in fact,
never amounts to] indication of position or momentum of particle 2.” What I am unable
to understand, and therefore compelled to disavow, is their attempt at an explanation:
That is, if the measuring apparatus for particle 1 is macroscopic and has a
sharp distribution, this does not permit us to consider the space for another
object on the other side to be real. Otherwise, we encounter some kind of
strong non-locality which prevents the spatial distribution of the measuring
apparatus of the particle 1 to be sharp.
SJG go on to “demonstrate the deficiency of such a reasoning” by considering the case in
which there is no spacelike separation, so that “there might be a local causal link between
the two particles”.
If there could be a local causal link between the two correlated particles, while
the physical properties of only one of them is indicated, what can one say about
8Nothing, that is to say, apart from the classical boundary condition that stipulates that the electron
did not pass the slit plate anywhere but at the slits, or the fact that no electron passes the slit plate if
both slits are shut.
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the physical properties of the other one? According to quantum mechanics,
in such circumstances, the whole system is described by an entangled state.
For one thing, one can speak of the spacelike separation between two events such as
measurements but one cannot speak of the spacelike separation between two particles.
For another, since SJG assume that no direct measurement is performed on particle 2, the
question of whether a measurement performed on particle 1 can be taken to indicate the
possession of a particular property by particle 2, has nothing to do with the existence or
nonexistence of a spacelike separation. If the two particles are correlated, then they are
necessarily “described” by an entangled state, for saying that they are correlated is the
same as saying that they are “described” by an entangled state—namely, that the joint
probability distributions associated with the possible outcomes of direct measurements
performed on both particles do not factorize. The conclusion that
[o]nce one measures a correlated property for one of the particles, the same
property is also measured indirectly for the other particle
may be justifiable within the interpretational scheme SJG have at the back of their minds,
but it is not, under any circumstances, justified by quantum mechanics itself.9 One gets
a glimpse of that interpretational scheme when SJG notice “a gap between Mohrhoff’s
interpretation and a minimal causal description of quantum mechanics” and point out a
difference
between the two notions of indication and measurement (at least, in von Neu-
mann’s approach who describes the measurement as an interaction followed
by a collapse)[.]
Anyone modestly familiar with the PIQM will be aware that it rejects not merely the no-
tion of collapse but the very notion that is responsible for the conundrum of collapse—the
notion of quantum state evolution. A quantum state |ψ(t)〉 is not an evolving, instanta-
neous state of affairs that obtains at the time t, and that collapses (or appears to collapse)
at the time of a measurement. It is an algorithm that serves to assign probabilities to
the possible outcomes of any measurement that may be performed—either actually or
counterfactually—at the time t. The parameter t refers to the time of this measurement.
Without reference to a measurement, it is ill-defined.
As for the gap between the PIQM and a minimal causal interpretation of quantum
mechanics, that certainly exists. As said, value-indicating events lack causally sufficient
conditions (Ulfbeck & Bohr, 2001; Mohrhoff, 2002b, 2004a). This alone is sufficient to
conclude that the quantum-mechanical correlations between such events do not admit of
9By “quantum mechanics itself” I mean the mathematical formalism together with what Redhead
(1987) has called the “minimal instrumentalist interpretation” (p. 44).
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a causal interpretation. The search for a causal explanation of these correlations puts
the cart before the horse. It is the laws governing these correlations that determine
the extent to which causal concepts can be used. Such concepts are applicable only to
the macroworld (see below), where the statistical correlation laws of quantum physics
degenerate into the deterministic laws of classical physics, for this alone makes it possible
to think of the correlata as causes and effects.
4 The macroworld
SJG maintain that both the Copenhagen interpretation and the PIQM “require something
beyond a quantum process for attributing physical reality to the realm of micro-physics.”
While I cannot vouch for the Copenhagen interpretation, which comes in a variety of fla-
vors, there is no such thing as a quantum process where the PIQM is concerned. It rejects
the notion of a quantum process for the same reason that it rejects the notion of quantum
state evolution. What there is, according to it, is property-indicating events, properties
indicated by events, and the macroworld, which encompasses the property-indicating
events as unpredictable changes in the values of macroscopic positions. Whereas the in-
dicated properties owe their existence to the indicating events, the macroworld depends
on nothing external to itself.
An explanation is in order. Let us note, to begin with, that no object ever has a sharp
position (relative to another object).10 Some objects, however, have the sharpest posi-
tions in existence. Moreover, the possibility of obtaining evidence of the departure of an
object O from its classically predictable position11 calls for detectors whose position prob-
ability distributions are narrower than O’s—detectors that can probe the (intrinsically
undifferentiated) region over which O’s fuzzy position extends. Such detectors evidently
do not exist for those objects that have the sharpest positions in existence. For them the
probability of obtaining evidence of departures from the classically predictable motion is
very low. Hence among them there are many of which the following is true: every one of
their indicated positions is consistent with (i) every prediction that can be made on the
basis of previously indicated properties and (ii) a classical law of motion. These are the
objects I call “macroscopic”. To permit a macroscopic object to indicate a measurement
outcome, one exception has to be made: its position may change unpredictably if and
when it serves to indicate an outcome.12
10In a non-relativistic world this is so because the exact localization of a particle implies an infinite
momentum dispersion and hence an infinite mean energy. In a relativistic world the attempt to produce
a strictly localized particle results instead in the production of particle-antiparticle pairs.
11By a “classically predictable position” I mean a position that is predicted by the appropriate classical
law of motion on the basis of the relevant earlier property-indicating facts.
12Instead of being evidence of the fuzziness of the “pointer” position, such an unpredictable change
is evidence of the counterfactual fuzziness of the observable measured—the fuzziness that would have
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The positions of macroscopic objects—macroscopic positions, for short—indicate each
other’s values so abundantly, so persistently, and so sharply that they are fuzzy only in re-
lation to an imaginary background that is more differentiated (spacewise) than the actual
world. The region over which a macroscopic position is “smeared out” is never probed
(by definition). Relating as it does to a purely imaginary background, its fuzziness is
itself purely imaginary. The contentious question of whether macroscopic objects (prop-
erly defined) obey the classical or the quantum laws, is therefore ill-posed. Macroscopic
positions obey both the classical and the quantum laws, inasmuch as the quantum laws
degenerate into the classical laws whenever the fuzziness of observables can be ignored.
Where macroscopic positions are concerned, this is always.
Within the interpretational scheme under discussion, the extrinsic nature of the values
of physical observables is a consequence of their fuzziness. Because macroscopic positions
are fuzzy only in relation to an imaginary background that is more differentiated than
the actual world, or because (by definition) they never evince their fuzziness (through
departures from classically predicted values), they are intrinsic not merely FAPP but for
all quantitative purposes. At the same time they, too, are extrinsic. Even the Moon
has a position only because of a myriad of effective “pointer positions” that betoken its
whereabouts. Whereas we cannot, therefore, attribute independent existence to individual
macroscopic positions, we can attribute independent existence to the macroworld, defined
as the totality of relative positions between macroscopic objects.
In spite of having argued along these lines in several papers, SJG detect a “hidden
role of observer in Mohrhoff’s interpretation”:
one could declare that an indication without an observer has no meaning in
the quantum domain, even if the classical objects are considered to be self-
indicating. . . For without an observer, it cannot be verified if any property is
really indicated for quantum systems.
Whereas every sufficiently comprehensive physical theory defines a set of nomologically
possible worlds, no physical theory can differentiate between the actual world and another
nomologically possible world (let alone account for the existence of the actual world).
In classical physics we identify the actual world as the possible world whose initial (or
final, or intermediate) conditions match the observed initial (or final, or intermediate)
conditions. In quantum physics we identify the actual world as the possible world whose
property-indicating events match the observed property-indicating events. Needless to
say, it is as impossible to observe all property-indicating events as it would be to observe
the complete initial conditions of a classical world (if such a world existed). My point
here is that if the conclusion that classical physics presupposes conscious observers is
obtained if no measurement had been made.
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unwarranted, then the conclusion that quantum physics presupposes conscious observers
is equally unwarranted.
In reality, we are not given a set of nomologically possible worlds and required to
identify the actual world. We are given the actual world, whose laws define a set of
possible worlds. The question is, do these laws admit the construction of a theoretical
model that can be thought of as the model of a free-standing (Fuchs & Peres, 2000ab)
or strongly objective (d’Espagnat, 1989, 1995) reality capable of existing without being
given? In other words, can the “full elision of the subject” (Bitbol, 1990) be achieved?
As far as classical physics is concerned, the widely accepted answer is a virtually un-
qualified Yes. According to the PIQM, the answer is equally affirmative where quantum
physics is concerned. It is, however, considerably less straightforward to arrive at it. One
has to decide which of the structures that can be constructed on the foundation of the
mathematical formalism and its minimal instrumentalist interpretation (Redhead, 1987),
describes what is independently real. There is no question in my mind that this can only
be the macroworld.
So it is not quite on target to say without appropriate qualifications, as SJG do,
that I believe in “a clear distinction between the micro and macro-worlds”. A clear
distinction there is, but it is like the distinction between a sequence and its limit rather
than that between domains on either side of a boundary: among the world’s more or
less fuzzy relative positions, the least fuzzy are in a category of their own. Without
ceasing to be extrinsic and governed by the laws of quantum mechanics, they are at the
same time intrinsic for all quantitative purposes and governed by classical laws. Nor is
it quite on target to say that “[a]ccording to Mohrhoff, the presence of the macroscopic
world actualizes some realities in the microscopic domain” for, like the already quoted
assertion that the PIQM requires “something beyond a quantum process for attributing
physical reality to the realm of micro-physics”, this suggests the existence of a microscopic
domain of potential realities waiting to be actualized. The underlying viewpoint also finds
expression when SJG state that
we are always confronted with the question of how can one be assured of
whether a measuring apparatus performs a measurement or not? For example,
in Schro¨dinger’s cat experiment, one cannot distinguish that the cat is dead
or alive. . . when the cat is not observed and there is no perception of what
was being measured[.]
Just as we are not given a set of nomologically possible worlds and required to identify
the actual world, so we are not given a set of possible measurement outcomes (or a set
of possible measurements each with its own set of possible outcomes) and required to
identify the actual outcome. The need to account for the rather more persuasive reality
of actual outcomes only arises if probability algorithms are misconstrued as physical states
of some kind.
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SJG miss “a quantitative criterion for defining the sharpness of a spatial distribution”.
I wonder why, since quantitative measures for the spread of probability distributions are
common in standard probability theory. They further point out that we may not be able
to distinguish between a sharp distribution and a non-sharp distribution. This is the
reason why I defined “macroscopic” in a way that does not require that the probability
of finding a macroscopic object where classically it could not be, be strictly zero. What
the definition requires is that there be no position-indicating event that is inconsistent
with predictions that could in principle be made on the basis of a classical law of motion
and earlier property-indicating events. To be sure, we cannot be one hundred percent
certain that a given object, however large or massive, falls in this category. Even if we had
access to every existing record of its past whereabouts and knew all relevant boundary
conditions, we might not be in a position to completely rule out the possibility of finding
it where classically it could not be. But this does not affect the existence of macroscopic
positions or their ability to indicate measurement outcomes. To the common objection
that the probability of the “erasure” of a measurement outcome is never strictly 0, the
PIQM replies that, by virtue of its definition of “macroscopic,” a record created by an
unpredictable, outcome-indicating change in the value of a macroscopic position is never
erased (Mohrhoff, 2004b).
SJG asks whether one could “say that in the absence of the classical world there was
no room for anything else to be in existence”.
We should not forget that we did not have a world obeying the rules of clas-
sical mechanics from the beginning. The existence of [a] classical world, with
objects having sharp spatial distribution, requires certain conditions which
have not been there all the time. For example, what kind of reality could
one ascribe to fundamental particles in the early universe, when there was no
indication? Apparently, Mohrhoff takes it for granted that the classical world
has always been there and that it will exist in the future.
These are intriguing questions, to which I hazarded tentative answers in a paper that
SJG seem to have missed (Mohrhoff, 2002d). We are familiar with the idea that the
application of spatiotemporal concepts is limited to positive cosmological times. Given
an expanding universe, this limitation is a consequence of a classical theory (general
relativity). Quantum theory implies limitations on the applicability of classical concepts
and (hence) on the validity of implications from classical theories. In particular, if we
go sufficiently far back in cosmological time, we enter an era in which there is as yet no
macroworld. If nothing happens or is the case unless it is indicated by macro events or
states of affairs, then this entire era supervenes on the macroworld. It exists only because,
and only to the extent that, it is indicated by goings-on in the macroworld. Thus instead
of taking for granted that the macroworld has always been there, I assert that it has not.
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The reality that one can ascribe to the properties of the universe at pre-macroscopic times
is of the same kind as the reality that one can ascribe to the properties of a quantum
system S between measurements.
To elucidate the similarity, I need to hark back to a point discussed in my (2004ab). As
you will recall, the time on which a quantum state depends (in the Schro¨dinger picture) is
the time of a measurement.13 As far as the measured observable is concerned, it is the time
at which the indicated value is possessed.14 Unless the Hamiltonian is 0, the probability
distributions describing a fuzzy state of affairs between measurements depend on the
times of unperformed measurements. The antecedents of the counterfactual probability
assignments describing this state of affairs are false not only because they affirm that a
measurement is made but also because they affirm that this is made at a particular time.
How real is this particular time—or the distinction we make between before and after
this time—as far as S is concerned? According to the PIQM, it is as real for S as the
distinction we make between “through L” and “through R” is for an electron in a two-
slit experiment that requires that amplitudes be added; that is to say, not real at all. A
particular time exists for S if and only if it is the indicated time of possession of a particular
property. As far as S is concerned, the time between successive actual measurements is
only counterfactually differentiated (i.e., by unperformed measurements).
The reality that one can attribute to the pre-macroscopic universe is of the same
kind, except that this era is prior to all measurements rather than situated between
measurements. The relevant counterfactual probability assignments are therefore based
on later outcomes (using Born’s rule).15
5 Completeness
It is generally taken for granted that if quantum states are probability algorithms, then
quantum mechanics is an incomplete theory.16 This conclusion would be warranted if
quantum-mechanical probabilities were defined as relative frequencies (which according
13The same goes for the time on which the “two-state” introduced by Aharonov and Vaidman (1991)
depends. A two-state is to the ABL rule what an “ordinary” quantum state is to the Born rule.
14See Sec. 6 of my (2004a) for a discussion of the ambiguity of “time of measurement.”
15In other words, the only density operator that one can meaningfully associate with the pre-
macroscopic universe is an advanced or “retropared” one—a density operator that “evolves” toward
the past in the same (spurious) sense in which a retarded or “prepared” density operator “evolves”
toward the future.
16For instance: “The quantum wave function ψ might be merely a mathematical tool for calculating
and predicting the measured frequencies of outcomes over an ensemble of similar experiments. . . However,
even in the statistical interpretation, the ‘measurement problem’ in the more general sense remains. For
quantum theory is then an incomplete theory that refers only to ensembles” (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini,
2006).
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to the PIQM is not the case) or if quantum mechanics were incapable of encompassing the
value-indicating events to which it serves to assign probabilities (which, as we have seen, is
also not the case). What about SJG’s objection that in “all interpretations that consider
quantum mechanics to be complete and final. . . there are always certain questions that
physics should not attempt to answer, as they go beyond the quantum description”?
No matter what the fundamental theory eventually turns out to be, as long as there
is a fundamental theory, there will always be the mystery of its origin. A fundamental
theory will always be incomplete in this minimal sense.17 It will also be incomplete in
the sense that it cannot explain why there is anything, rather than nothing at all.
As it is the objective of the PIQM to make sense of a hypothetical world in which
the quantum-mechanical probability assignments are always exactly right, I take it for
granted that the fundamental theory is quantum-mechanical in nature. If there are ad-
ditional questions that quantum mechanics fails to answer, it is (I believe) not because
the theory is incomplete but because the physical world is incomplete—as compared to
certain theoretical expectations that have psychological underpinnings (Mohrhoff, 2005a,
2006a) but are physically unwarranted.
• Whereas the quantum-mechanical probability algorithm cannot provide sufficient
conditions for the occurrence of value-indicating events, this signals the incomplete-
ness of the theory only if such conditions nevertheless exist; otherwise it signals an
“incompleteness” of the physical world.
• Whereas the use of causal concepts is confined to the macroworld, this signals
the incompleteness of the theory only if a micro causal nexus nevertheless exists;
otherwise it signals another “incompleteness” of the physical world.
• Whereas no values can be assigned to unmeasured observables, this signals the in-
completeness of the theory only if unmeasured observables nevertheless have values;
otherwise it signals yet another “incompleteness” of the physical world.
In fact, the incomplete differentiation of the physical world (spatiotemporal as well as
substantial) is (i) a straightforward consequence of the principal interpretational strategy
of the PIQM and (ii) one of its most significant implications. If in our minds we partition
the world into smaller and smaller spatial regions, there comes a point beyond which
there is no material object for which these regions, or the corresponding distinctions,
exist. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for the temporal and substantial distinctions
we make (Mohrhoff, 2002d, 2005b, 2006a). They are warranted by property-indicating
events, and the latter do not license an absolute and unlimited objectification of the
former.
17 If at all a fundamental theory can be explained, it is in weakly teleological terms. For quantum




According to Schro¨dinger (1935), entanglement is “not. . . one but rather the characteristic
trait of quantum mechanics.” According to Misner et al. (1973), the central mystery of
physics is the “miraculous identity” (p. 1215) of particles of the same type. According
to Feynman et al. (1965, Sec. 1–1), the double-slit experiment with electrons “has in
it the heart of quantum mechanics.” According to Stapp (1975), Bell’s theorem is “the
most profound discovery in science.” To my mind, all of these extraordinary features of
quantum mechanics are subsumed and eclipsed by the supervenience of the microscopic
on the macroscopic, which flies in the face of a twenty-five centuries old paradigm. It
no longer is appropriate to ask: what are the ultimate building blocks, and how do
they interact and combine?18 Nor is the incomplete spatiotemporal differentiation of the
physical world consistent with theoretical models that construct physical reality on the
foundation of an intrinsically and completely differentiated spatiotemporal expanse, by
associating physical properties with spacetime points.
According to the identity of indiscernibles, A and B are one and the same thing just
in case there is no difference between A and B. There is no difference between two
fundamental particles if each is considered by itself, out of relation to any other object.19
Hence, considered out of relation to their relations, all fundamental particles are identical
in the strong sense of numerical identity. In a well-defined sense, therefore, the number of
“ultimate constituents” equals one. A similar conclusion can be reached by noting that
the number of particles in a relativistic quantum system is a quantum observable. As such
it is a property of the system as a whole, and it has a (definite) value only if (and only
when) it is actually measured. In a well-defined sense, therefore, a relativistic quantum
system is an intrinsically undivided whole, including the largest conceivable system—the
physical universe.
The appropriate question to ask is: how does the Ultimate Constituent manifest
itself? How does it take on properties? How does it constitute an apparent multitude
of objects, and how does it realize their forms? Quantum mechanics (as seen through
the eyes of the PIQM) suggest this simple answer: by entering into spatial relations with
itself, the Ultimate Constituent gives rise to both matter and space, inasmuch as space is
the totality of existing spatial relations, whereas matter is the corresponding (apparent)
18This follows not only from the extrinsic nature of the values of observables but also from the incom-
pleteness of the world’s substantial differentiation (Mohrhoff, 2002d, 2005b, 2006a).
19A fundamental particle considered by itself lacks internal structure and, hence, a form. Since motion
is relative, we cannot attribute to it any of the properties that derive their meanings from the quantum-
mechanical description of motion (that is, from external symmetry operations). Nor can we attribute
to it any kind of charge, since charges derive their meanings from the quantum-mechanical description
of interactions (that is, from internal symmetry operations). Quantum statistics, finally, rules out the
association of distinct identities with objects lacking persistent and unswappable properties.
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multitude of relata—“apparent” because the relations are self -relations.
If we equate the manifested world with the macroworld, then quantum mechan-
ics affords us a glimpse “behind” the manifested world at formless particles and non-
visualizable atoms, which, instead of being the world’s constituent parts or structures,
are instrumental in its manifestation. However, it allows us to describe what we “see”
only in terms of inferences from macroevents and their quantum-mechanical correlations.
If we experience something the like of which we never experienced before, we are obliged
to describe it in terms of familiar experiences. By the same token, what lies “behind” the
manifested world can only be described in terms of the finished product—the macroworld.
I believe that this way of thinking makes the supervenience of the microscopic on the
macroscopic a tad less mysterious.
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